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Abstract
We consider a model of matching in trading networks in which firms can enter into
bilateral contracts. In trading networks, stable outcomes, which are immune to devia-
tions of arbitrary sets of firms, may not exist. We define a new solution concept called
trail stability. Trail-stable outcomes are immune to consecutive, pairwise deviations
between linked firms. We show that any trading network with bilateral contracts has
a trail-stable outcome whenever firms’ choice functions satisfy the full substitutabil-
ity condition. For trail-stable outcomes, we prove results on the lattice structure, the
rural hospitals theorem, strategy-proofness, and comparative statics of firm entry and
exit. We also introduce weak trail stability which is implied by trail stability under full
substitutability. We describe relationships between the solution concepts.
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1 Introduction
Modern production is highly interconnected. Firms typically have a large number of buy-
ers and suppliers and dozens of intermediaries add value to final products before they reach
the consumer. In this paper, we study the structure of contractual relationships between
firms. In our model, firms have heterogeneous preferences over sets of bilateral contracts
with other firms. Contracts may encode many dimensions of a relationship including the
price, quantity, quality, and delivery time. The universe of possible relationships between
firms is described by a trading network—a multi-sided matching market in which firms form
downstream contracts to sell outputs and upstream contracts to buy inputs.
We focus on the existence and structure of stable outcomes in decentralized, real-world
matching markets. In production networks that we consider in this paper, stable outcomes
play the role of equilibrium and may serve as a reasonable prediction of the outcome of
market interactions (Kelso and Crawford, 1982, Roth, 1984, Hatfield et al., 2013).1 We ob-
tain a general result: any trading network has an outcome that satisfies a natural extension
of pairwise stability (Gale and Shapley, 1962). Our model of matching markets subsumes
many previous models of matching with contracts, including many-to-one (Gale and Shapley,
1962, Crawford and Knoer, 1981, Kelso and Crawford, 1982, Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005)
and many-to-many matching markets (Roth, 1984, Sotomayor, 1999, 2004, Echenique and Oviedo,
2006, Klaus and Walzl, 2009).
We build on a seminal contribution by Ostrovsky (2008), who introduced a matching
model of supply chains. In a supply chain, there are agents, who only supply inputs (e.g.
farmers); agents, who only buy final outputs (e.g. consumers); while the rest of the agents are
intermediaries, who buy inputs and sell outputs (e.g. supermarkets). All agents are partially
ordered along the supply chain: downstream (upstream) firms cannot sell to (buy from) firms
upstream (downstream) i.e. the trading network is acyclic. His key assumption about the
market, which we retain in his paper, was that firms’ choice functions over contracts satisfy
same-side substitutability and cross-side complementarity conditions (Hatfield and Kominers
(2012) later referred to these conditions jointly as full substitutability). This assumption re-
quires that firms view any downstream or any upstream contracts as substitutes, but any
downstream and any upstream contract as complements.2 Ostrovsky (2008) showed that
1The “market design” literature has emphasized the importance of the existence of stable outcomes in
order to prevent centralized matching markets from unraveling (Roth, 1991). One market design application
of our model is electricity trading in peer-to-peer power systems (Morstyn et al., 2018).
2Same-side substitutability is a fairly strong assumption as, for example, it rules out any complemen-
tarities in inputs. There is evidence that modern manufacturing firms rely on many complementary in-
puts (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, Fox, 2010). Hatfield and Kominers (2015) and Rostek and Yoder (2017)
consider a multilateral matching market with complements. Alva and Teytelboym (2015) analyze supply
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any supply chain has a chain-stable outcome for which there are no blocking upstream or
downstream chains of contracts. Hatfield and Kominers (2012) further showed that, in the
presence of network acyclicity, chain-stable outcomes are equivalent to stable outcomes i.e.
those that are immune to deviations by arbitrary sets of firms. Even under full substitutabil-
ity, stable/chain-stable outcomes in supply chains may be Pareto inefficient.3
While a supply chain may be a good model of production in certain industries (Antràs and Chor,
2013), in general, firms simultaneously supply inputs to and buy outputs from other firms
(possibly through intermediaries). If this is the case, we say a trading network contains
a contract cycle. For example, the sectoral input-output network of the U.S. economy,
illustrated by Acemoglu et al. (2012, Figure 3), shows that American firms are very in-
terdependent and the trading network contains many cycles. Consider a coal mine that
supplies coal to a steel factory. The factory uses coal to produce steel, which is an input
for a manufacturing firm that sells mining equipment back to the mine. This creates a
contract cycle. However, Hatfield and Kominers (2012) showed that if a trading network
without transfers has a contract cycle then stable outcomes may fail to exist. Moreover,
Fleiner, Jankó, Schlotter, and Teytelboym (2018) show that checking whether a stable out-
come exists—or even whether a given outcome is stable—is computationally intractable.
We show that, even in the presence of contract cycles, outcomes that satisfy a different
stability concept—trail stability—can still be found. A trail of contracts is a set of con-
tracts which can be ordered in such a way that the buyer in one contract is the seller in the
subsequent one. Along a locally blocking trail, whenever a firm receives an upstream (down-
stream) offer, it can either accept it unconditionally or hold the offer and make a myopic,
unilateral downstream (upstream) offer. Trail stability rules out any such locally blocking
trails. We argue that trail stability is a useful, natural, and intuitive equilibrium concept for
the analysis of matching markets in networks because locally blocking trails do not require
extensive coordination among recontracting parties. In general trading networks, stable and
chain-stable outcomes are trail-stable under full substitutability (but not in general). Trail
chains in which inputs could be complementary or substitutable with general preferences. Jagadeesan (2017)
explores trading networks with complementary inputs in a large market setting. While production de-
cisions often create externalities, we assume that firms only care about the contracts they are involved
in (Sasaki and Toda, 1996, Bando, 2012, Pycia, 2012, Pycia and Yenmez, 2015). In addition, we work
in a complete information environment; for a treatment with asymmetric information, see Roth (1989),
Ehlers and Massó (2007), Chakraborty et al. (2010). Extending our model to incorporate incomplete infor-
mation and externalities is a promising area for further research.
3Inefficiency arises even in two-sided many-to-many matching markets without contracts if agents have
multi-unit demands: Blair (1988) and Roth and Sotomayor (1990, p. 177) provide the earliest examples;
Echenique and Oviedo (2006), Klaus and Walzl (2009) discuss the setting with contracts. Westkamp (2010)
provides necessary and sufficient conditions on the structure contract relationships in the supply chain for
chain-stable outcomes to be efficient.
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stability is equivalent to chain stability (and therefore to stability under our assumptions)
in acyclic trading networks and to pairwise stability in two-sided matching markets.
Trail-stable outcomes correspond to the fixed-points of an operator and form a particular
lattice structure for terminal agents who can sign only upstream or only downstream con-
tracts. The lattice reflects the classic opposition-of-interests property of two-sided markets,
but in our case the opposition of interests is between terminal buyers and terminal sellers. In
addition to this strong lattice property, we extend previous results on the existence of buyer-
and seller-optimal stable outcomes, the rural hospitals theorem, strategy-proofness as well
as comparative statics on firm entry and exit that have only been studied in a supply-chain
or two-sided setting under general choice functions.
We then introduce another solution concept called weak trail stability which ensures that
firms are willing to sign all their contracts along a sequentially blocking trail (rather than
simply upstream-downstream pair along a locally blocking trail). This might be a useful
solution concept if the blocking contracts are not fulfilled quickly. Stable and chain-stable
outcome are always weakly trail-stable. We show the under full substitutability weakly
trail-stable outcomes exist because trail-stable outcomes are weakly trail-stable (without full
substitutability, however, trail-stable outcomes may not be weakly trail-stable).
Our work complements an important recent paper by Hatfield et al. (2015) which shows
that in general trading networks, under certain conditions, stable outcomes coincide with
chain-stable outcomes i.e. those immune to coordinated deviations by a set of firms which
is simultaneously signing a trail of contracts. Our paper is also related to the stability of
(continuous and discrete) network flows discussed by Fleiner (2009, 2014). In these models,
agents choose the amount of “flow” they receive from upstream and downstream agents and
have preferences over who they receive the “flow” from. The network flow model allows for
cycles. However, the choice functions in the network flow models are restricted by Kirchhoff’s
(current) law (the total amount of incoming (current) flow is equal to the total amount of
outgoing flow) and in the discrete case these choice functions are special cases of Ostrovsky
(2008). This paper therefore generalizes both of the supply chain and the network flow
models, while offering two appealing new solution concepts.
Hatfield et al. (2013) were the first to consider a general trading network model and
proved that stable outcomes always exist under full substitutability in a transferable utility
(TU) economy. However, TU rules out wealth effects and distortionary frictions, such as sales
taxes, bargaining costs, or incomplete financial markets. Fleiner, Jagadeesan, Jankó, and Teytelboym
(2018) consider a variation of our model in which every contract specifies a trade and a con-
tinuous price (see also Hatfield et al., 2015). They show that, under full substitutability,
trail-stable outcomes are essentially equivalent to competitive equilibrium outcomes. In the
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presence of distortionary frictions, however, they show that competitive equilibria are not
stable (in fact, stable outcomes may not exist) and can even be Pareto-comparable.4 Hence,
trail stability can also serve a cooperative interpretation of competitive equilibrium in set-
tings where price-taking behavior is not a plausible assumption.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we present the ingredients of the model, including
the trading network, main assumptions on choice functions, and terminal agents. In Section
2.5, we introduce stability, chain stability, and trail stability. Then, in Section 3, we report
the existence of trail-stable outcomes before digging deeper into their structure. In Section 4,
we introduce weak trail stability and describe its relationship to stability and trail stability.
Finally, we conclude and outline some directions for future work. Appendix A summarizes
all solution concepts, results and nomenclature used in this paper with reference to previous
work and describes which previous results we have generalized in our setting of trading
networks with general choice functions. Appendix B provides proofs of the main results.
In Appendix C, we give sufficient conditions on preferences that ensure that trail-stable
and stable outcomes or trail-stable and weakly trail-stable outcomes coincide. Appendix D
considers yet another solution concept.
2 Model
2.1 Ingredients
There is finite set of agents (firms or consumers) F and a finite set of contracts (trading
network) X.5 A contract x ∈ X is a bilateral agreement between a buyer b(x) ∈ F and
a seller s(x) ∈ F . A (trading) cycle in X is a sequence of firms (f1, . . . , fM) such that for
all m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} there exists a contract xm such that s(xm) = fm and b(xm) = fm+1
(subscripts modulo M). Hence, F (x) = {s(x), b(x)} is the set of firms associated with
contract x and, more generally, F (Y ) is the set of firms associated with contract set Y ⊆ X.
Denote XBf = {x ∈ X|b(x) = f} and X
S
f = {x ∈ X|s(x) = f} the sets of f ’s upstream and
downstream contracts—i.e. the contract for which f is a buyer and a seller, respectively.
Clearly, Y Bf and Y
S
f form a partition over the set of contracts Y f = {y ∈ Y |f ∈ F (y)} which
involve f , since an agent cannot be a buyer and a seller in the same contract.
4Without distortionary frictions, competitive equilibrium outcomes are stable and in the core even
in the presence of wealth effects (Fleiner, Jagadeesan, Jankó, and Teytelboym, 2018). In earlier work,
Hatfield et al. (2013) and Hatfield and Kominers (2015) made this observation in a TU economy.
5The standard justification for this assumption is given by Roth (1984, p. 49): “elements of a [contract]
can take on only discrete values; salary cannot be specified more precisely than to the nearest penny, hours
to the nearest second, etc.” In fact, the finiteness assumption is not necessary for our existence proof. We
only require that the set of contracts between any two agents forms a complete lattice.
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Our structure is more general than the setting described by Ostrovsky (2008), Westkamp
(2010) or Hatfield and Kominers (2012). Each firm f ∈ F is associated with a vertex of a
directed multigraph (F,X) and each contract x ∈ X is a directed edge of this graph. For any
f , the set XBf corresponds to the set of incoming edges and X
S
f to the set of outgoing edges.
An acyclic trading network (a supply chain) contains no directed cycles in the graph. Supply
chains require a partial order on the firms’ positions in the chain although firms may sell
to (buy from) any downstream (upstream) level. In our model, we consider general trading
networks, which may contain contract cycles (i.e. directed cycles on the graph).
Every firm has a choice function Cf , such that Cf(Yf) ⊆ Yf for any Yf ⊆ Xf .
6 We say
that choice functions of f ∈ F satisfy the irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) condition
if for any Y ⊆ X and Cf(Y ) ⊆ Z ⊆ Y we have that Cf(Z) = Cf(Y ) (Blair, 1988, Alkan,
2002, Fleiner, 2003, Echenique, 2007, Aygün and Sönmez, 2013).7
For any Y ⊆ X and Z ⊆ X, define the chosen set of upstream contracts
CfB(Y |Z) = C
f (Y Bf ∪ Z
S
f ) ∩X
B
f (2.1)
which is the set of contracts f chooses as a buyer when f has access to upstream contracts
Y and downstream contracts Z. Analogously, define the chosen set of downstream contracts
CfS(Z|Y ) = C
f (ZSf ∪ Y
B
f ) ∩X
S
f (2.2)
Hence, we can define rejected sets of contracts RfB(Y |Z) = Yf \ C
f
B(Y |Z) and R
f
S(Z|Y ) =
Zf \ C
f
S(Z|Y ). An outcome A ⊆ X is a set of contracts.
A set of contracts A ⊆ X is individually rational for an agent f ∈ F if Cf (Af) = Af . We
call set A acceptable if A is individually rational for all agents f ∈ F . For sets of contracts
W,A ⊆ X, we say that A is (W, f)-acceptable if Af ⊆ C
f(Wf ∪ Af ) i.e. if the agent f
chooses all contracts from set Af whenever she is offered A alongside W . Set of contracts A
is W -acceptable if A is (W, f)-acceptable for all agents f ∈ F . Note that contract set A is
individually rational for agent f if and only if it is (∅, f)-acceptable. If y ∈ XBf and z ∈ X
S
f
then {y, z} is a (W, f)-essential pair if neither {y} nor {z} is (W, f)-acceptable but {y, z}
is (W, f)-acceptable. Note that any essential pair consists of exactly one upstream and one
downstream contract.
6Since firms only care about their own contracts, we can write Cf (Y ) to mean Cf (Yf ).
7In our setting, IRC is equivalent to the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (Aygün and Sönmez, 2013,
Alva, 2018).
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2.2 Assumptions on choice functions
We can now state our key assumption on choice functions introduced by Ostrovsky (2008)
and Hatfield and Kominers (2012).
Definition 1. Choice functions of f ∈ F are fully substitutable if for all Y ′ ⊆ Y ⊆ X and
Z ′ ⊆ Z ⊆ X they are:
1. Same-side substitutable (SSS):
(a) RfB(Y
′|Z) ⊆ RfB(Y |Z)
(b) RfS(Z
′|Y ) ⊆ RfS(Z|Y )
2. Cross-side complementary (CSC):
(a) RfB(Y |Z) ⊆ R
f
B(Y |Z
′)
(b) RfS(Z|Y ) ⊆ R
f
S(Z|Y
′)
Contracts are fully substitutable if every firm regards any of its upstream or any of
its downstream contracts as substitutes, but its upstream and downstream contracts as
complements. Hence, rejected downstream (upstream) contracts continue to be rejected
whenever the set of offered downstream (upstream) contracts expands or whenever the set
of offered upstream (downstream) contracts shrinks.
2.3 Laws of Aggregate Demand and Supply
We first re-state the familiar Laws of Aggregate Demand and Supply (LAD/LAS) (Hatfield and Milgrom,
2005, Hatfield and Kominers, 2012). LAD (LAS) states that when a firm has more upstream
(downstream) contracts available (holding the same downstream (upstream) contracts), the
number of downstream (upstream) contracts the firms chooses does not increase more than
the number of upstream (downstream) contracts the firm chooses. Intuitively, an increase in
the availability of contracts on one side, does not increase the difference between the number
of contracts signed on either side.8
Definition 2. Choice functions of f ∈ F satisfy the Law of Aggregate Demand if for all
Y, Z ⊆ X and Y ′ ⊆ Y
|CfB(Y |Z)| − |C
f
B(Y
′|Z)| ≥ |CfS(Z|Y )| − |C
f
S(Z|Y
′)|
and the Law of Aggregate Supply if for all Y, Z ⊆ X and Z ′ ⊆ Z
|CfS(Z|Y )| − |C
f
S(Z
′|Y )| ≥ |CfB(Y |Z)| − |C
f
B(Y |Z
′)|
We can easily show that LAD/LAS imply IRC, extending the result by Aygün and Sönmez
(2013).
8This is an extension of the “cardinal monotonicity” condition (Alkan, 2002).
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Lemma 1. Suppose that choice function of f ∈ F satisfies full substitutability and LAD/LAS.
Then the choice function of f satisfies IRC.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider Y ⊂ Xf and z ∈ X
B
f \ Y such that z /∈ C
f(Y ∪ {z}). Then
(1), from SSS, we have that CfB(Y ∪ {z}) ⊆ C
f
B(Y ), and (2), from CSC, we have that
CfS(Y ∪ {z}) ⊇ C
f
S(Y ). If choice functions satisfy LAD/LAS, then we have that |C
f
B(Y )| −
|CfS(Y ))| ≤ |C
f
B(Y ∪ {z})| − |C
f
S(Y ∪ {z})|. But then both of the above the set inclusions
(1) and (2) must hold with equality, so Cf (Y ∪ {z}) = Cf(Y ) as required.
2.4 Terminal agents and terminal superiority
We now introduce some terminology that describes contracts of agents, who only act
as buyers or only act as sellers. A firm f is a terminal seller if there are no upstream
contracts for f in the network and f is a terminal buyer if the network does not contain
any downstream contracts for f . An agent who is either a terminal buyer or a terminal
seller is called a terminal agent. Let T denote the set of terminal agents in F and for a
set A of contracts let us denote the terminal contracts of A by AT =
⋃
{Af |f ∈ T }. A
set Y of contracts is terminal-acceptable if there is an acceptable set A of contracts such
that Y = AT . If A and W are terminal-acceptable sets of contracts then we say that A is
seller-superior to W (denoted by A S W ) if Cf(Af ∪Wf) = Af for each terminal seller
f and Cg(Ag ∪Wg) = Wg for each terminal buyer g. Similarly, A is buyer-superior to W
(denoted by A B W ) if Cf(Af ∪Wf ) = Wf for each terminal seller f and Cg(Ag∪Wg) = Ag
for each terminal buyer g.9 Clearly, these relations are opposite, that is, W S A if and only
if A B W holds. Whenever either relation holds, we call this partial order on outcomes
terminal superiority. Terminal agents are going to play a key role when we describe the
structure of outcomes in trading networks.
2.5 Solution concepts
We start off by defining two solution concepts that have appeared in previous work.
Definition 3 (Hatfield and Kominers 2012). An outcome A ⊆ X is stable10
9The superiority partial order is equivalent to the revealed preference relation (Alkan and Gale, 2003,
Chambers and Yenmez, 2017).
10Klaus and Walzl (2009) consider “weak setwise stable” outcomes which are immune to blocks in which
sets of agents must also agree on which contracts they can drop. Westkamp (2010) considers “group-stable”
outcomes which are immune to blocks in which sets of agents can sign better (rather the best) contracts (also
known as “setwise stable outcomes”, see Sotomayor, 1999, Echenique and Oviedo, 2006, Klaus and Walzl,
2009).
8
1. A is acceptable.
2. There exist no non-empty blocking set of contracts Z ⊆ X, such that Z ∩ A = ∅ and
Z is (A, f)-acceptable for all f ∈ F (Z).
Stable outcomes are immune to deviations by sets of firms, which can re-contract freely
among themselves while keeping any of their existing contracts. Stable outcomes always
exist in acyclic networks if choice functions are fully substitutable. In order to study more
general trading networks, we first introduce trails of contracts.
Definition 4. A non-empty set of contracts T is a trail if its elements can be arranged in
some order (x1, . . . , xM) such that b(xm) = s(xm+1) holds for all m ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1} where
M = |T |.
While a trail may not contain the same contract more than once, it may include the same
agents any number of times. For example, in Figure 1, there is a trail {w, z, y} that starts
from firm m (or j), ends at firm j (or m), and “visits” firm k.
Definition 5 (Hatfield et al. 2015). An outcome A ⊆ X is chain-stable if
1. A is acceptable.
2. There is no trail T , such that T ∩A = ∅ and T is (A, f)-acceptable for all f ∈ F (T ).
Hatfield et al. (2015) show that in general trading networks stable outcomes are equiva-
lent to chain-stable outcomes whenever choice functions satisfy full substitutability and Laws
of Aggregate Demand and Supply.11 However, Fleiner (2009) and Hatfield and Kominers
(2012) show that stable outcomes may not exist in general trading networks (see also Exam-
ple 1 below). Moreover, Fleiner, Jankó, Schlotter, and Teytelboym (2018) show that both
problems of determining whether a stable outcome exists and determining whether an out-
come is stable are computationally intractable.
The non-existence and computational intractability of stable outcomes motivates us to
define an alternative solution concept. We first define trail stability, which coincides with
pairwise stability in a two-sided many-to-many matching market with contracts and with
chain stability in supply chains.
Definition 6. An outcome A ⊆ X is trail-stable if
1. A is acceptable.
11Hatfield et al. (2015) refer to trails as “chains” hence the name “chain stability”. This extends the
definition of chain stability introduced by Ostrovsky (2008).
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Figure 1: Trading network in Examples 1, 3, and 4.
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Figure 2: Trading network in Example 2.
2. There is no trail T = {x1, x2, . . . , xM}, such that T ∩ A = ∅ and
(a) {x1} is (A, f1)-acceptable for f1 = s(x1), and
(b) {xm−1, xm} is (A, fm)-acceptable for fm = b(xm−1) = s(xm) whenever 1 < m ≤M
and
(c) {xM} is (A, fM+1)-acceptable for fM+1 = b(xM ).
The above trail T is called a locally blocking trail to A.
Trail stability is a natural solution concept when firms interact mainly with their buyers
and suppliers and deviations by arbitrary sets of firms are difficult to arrange. In a trail-stable
outcome, no agent wants to drop his contracts and there exists no sequence of consecutive
bilateral contracts comprising a trail preferred by all the agents in the trail to the current
outcome. First, f1 makes an unilateral offer of x1 (the first contract in the trail) to the buyer
f2. The buyer f2 then either unconditionally accepts the offer (forming a locally blocking
trail) or conditionally accepts the seller’s offer while looking to make a contract offer (x2)
to another buyer f3. If f2’s buyer in x2 happens to be f1, then f1 considers the offer of x2
on it own. If f1 accepts, we have a locally blocking trail. If f2’s buyer is not f1, then his
buyer f3 either accepts x2 unconditionally or looks for another seller f4 after a conditional
acceptance of x2. The trail of these linked conditional contract offers continues until the last
buyer fM+1 in the trail unconditionally accepts the upstream contract offer xM .
12. Note that
all intermediate agents only need to myopically decide whether they want to choose pairs
of upstream-downstream contract that “pass though” the agents along the trail. In other
words, whenever an agent receives a contract offer, he is “activated” to either accept or reject
it or to hold this offer while making his own contract offer.
The following example illustrates that trail-stable outcomes are not necessarily stable.13
12The trail and the order of conditional acceptances can, of course, be reversed with fM+1 offering the
first upstream contract to seller fM and so on.
13Example 1 is similar to examples in Fleiner (2009, p. 12) and Hatfield and Kominers (2012, Fig. 3, p.
13).
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Example 1 (Trail-stable outcomes are not necessarily stable). Consider four contracts x,
y, z and w. Assume that i = b(x), j = s(x) = s(z) = b(y) = b(w), k = b(z) = s(y) and
m = s(w) (see Figure 1). Agents have the following preferences that induce fully substi-
tutable choice functions:14
≻i : {x} ≻i ∅
≻m : {w} ≻m ∅
≻j : {x, y, w} ≻j {z, y, w} ≻j {x, y} ≻j {z, y} ≻j {w} ≻j ∅
≻k : {z, y} ≻k ∅
and other outcomes are not acceptable. A trail-stable outcome exists: A = {w}. The trail-
stable outcome {w} is Pareto-inefficient as {z, y, w}makes j and k better off without making
i and m worse off. There is, however, no stable outcome.15
To illustrate trail stability further, let us drop agents i and m and their corresponding
contracts from the example above (Figure 2). The new preferences of j are {y, z} ≻j ∅.
There is one stable outcome {y, z}. There are, however, two weakly trail-stable outcomes:
∅ and {y, z}. Is ∅ a reasonable possible outcome of this market? If coordination is difficult,
due to bargaining costs for example, firms may find it difficult to pin down blocking sets,
especially in large markets. Trail stability therefore provides a natural solution concept for
matching markets in which firms have a limited ability to coordinate their decisions in the
trading network.
3 Existence and properties of trail-stable outcomes
We can now state the first key result of this paper.
Theorem 1. Suppose that choice functions satisfy full substitutability and IRC. Then there
exists a trail-stable outcome.16
This theorem establishes a positive existence result for an appealing solution concept in
general trading networks: under the usual assumption of full substitutability, trail-stable
outcomes always exist.
14In all our examples, ≻ denotes a strict preference relation. Choice functions induced by strict preferences
satisfy IRC.
15One can check that there is no stable outcome since {w} ≻j {x,w} ≻k {x, z, w} ≻i,j {z, y, w} ≻j,k {w}
and other outcomes are not acceptable.
16Our results do not contradict Theorem 5 on the non-existence of stable outcomes in
Hatfield and Kominers (2012) since Theorem 1 only considers the existence of trail-stable outcomes.
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In order to prove Theorem 1, we use tools familiar to matching theory, such as the Tarski
fixed-point theorem (Adachi, 2000, Fleiner, 2003, Echenique and Oviedo, 2006, Hatfield and Milgrom,
2005, Ostrovsky, 2008, Hatfield and Kominers, 2012). Let XB and XS be two subsets of X
which represent the set of contracts offered to buyers and sellers. We define an isotone oper-
ator Φ that acts on (XB, XS) and show that any fixed-point (X˙B, X˙S) of Φ corresponds to a
trail-stable outcome A = X˙B ∩ X˙S. These tools allow us to explore properties of trail-stable
outcomes that have previously only been explored in a supply-chain or a two-sided setting.
As we have already seen, trail-stable outcomes are not always stable or chain-stable even
under full substitutability. However, the converse is true.
Proposition 1. Suppose that choice functions satisfy full substitutability and IRC. Then
any stable/chain-stable outcome is trail-stable.
Full substitutability is key to this result as the following example shows.
Example 2 (Stability and chain stability do not imply trail stability without full substi-
tutability). Consider two contracts y, z. Assume that j = s(z) = b(y), k = b(z) = s(y) (see
Figure 2). Agents have the following preferences:
≻j : {z} ≻j {y} ≻j ∅
≻k : {z, y} ≻k ∅.
and other outcomes are not acceptable. Note that k’s preference are fully substitutable, but
j’s preferences are not. The empty set of contracts is stable (and chain-stable), however, it
is not trail-stable since {z, y} is a locally blocking trail.
This example highlights that locally blocking trails need not be acceptable (alongside
other contracts) themselves: firm j “forgets” that it offered contract z when it considers the
terminal contract y offered in return by k. In Section 4, we will consider a solution concept
which ensures that agents are willing to accept all the contracts along a locally blocking trail
(perhaps alongside other contracts).
3.1 Structure of trail-stable outcomes
Recall that in the marriage model of Gale and Shapley, the existence of man-optimal
and woman-optimal stable matchings follow from the well-known lattice structure of stable
matchings. The key to extending this result to trading networks is to consider only terminal
agents. We say that a trail-stable outcome Amax (Amin) that is buyer-optimal (seller-optimal)
12
if any terminal buyer (terminal seller) prefers it to any other outcome i.e. for any trail-stable
Z ⊆ X, we have that Cf(Amax ∪ Z) = Af,max.
Proposition 2. Suppose that choice functions satisfy full substitutability and IRC. Then
the set of trail-stable outcomes contains buyer-optimal and seller-optimal outcomes.
Proposition 2 extends Theorem 2 by Ostrovsky (2008) and Theorem 4 by Hatfield and Kominers
(2012), which establish the existence of buyer- and seller-optimal outcomes in acyclic trad-
ing networks.17 We say that Y ⊆ X is terminal-trail-stable if there is a trail-stable outcome
A ⊆ X such that Y = AT .
Proposition 3. Suppose that choice functions satisfy full substitutability and LAD/LAS.
Then the terminal-trail-stable contract sets form a lattice under terminal superiority.
Proposition 3 shows that whenever LAD/LAS holds choice functions of terminal agents
define a natural partial order on outcomes and the terminal-trail-stable contract sets form a
lattice under this order.18 Note that for the lattice and the opposition-of-interests structure,
only terminal agents play a role: two outcomes are equivalent if all the terminal agents have
the same set of contracts. Indeed, if A1 and A2 are trail-stable outcomes then there is a
trail-stable outcome A+ such that all terminal buyers prefer A+ to both A1 and A2 and all
sellers prefer any of A1 and A2 to A+.19 This establishes full “polarization of interests” in
trail-stable outcomes in the sense of (Roth, 1985) and immediately implies the existence of
buyer-optimal (Amax) and seller-optimal (Amin) trail-stable outcomes. Therefore, our result
substantially strengthens and generalizes the previous results by Roth (1985), Blair (1988),
Echenique and Oviedo (2006) and Hatfield and Kominers (2012).
The lattice structure of fully-trail stable outcomes allows us to straightforwardly extend
two well-known properties of stable outcomes that have been known in two-sided matching
markets and acyclic trading networks. One such property is the classic “rural hospitals
theorem”, which shows that in every stable allocation of a two-sided many-to-one doctor-
hospital matching market, the same number of doctors are matched to every hospital (Roth,
1986). In buyer-seller networks, we can instead consider the difference between the number
of upstream and downstream contracts that firms sign (Hatfield and Kominers, 2012). The
following proposition gives the most general rural hospital theorem result.
17This is a common property of stable outcomes in two-sided markets with substitutable choice
functions, however, it typically fails in richer matching models (Pycia and Yenmez, 2015, Alva, 2015,
Alva and Teytelboym, 2015).
18In fact, our proof shows that the terminal-trail-stable contract sets form a sublattice (Blair, 1988, Fleiner,
2003, Echenique and Oviedo, 2006).
19Of course, the same holds for if we exchange the role of buyers and sellers.
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Proposition 4. Suppose that choice functions satisfy full substitutability and LAD/LAS.
Then, for each firm, the difference between the number of upstream contracts and the number
of downstream contracts is invariant across trail-stable outcomes.20
The lattice structure of trail-stable outcomes also gives a (somewhat weak) mechanism
design result.21 A mechanism M is a mapping from a profile of agents’ choice functions,
C
F = (Cf)f∈F , to the set of outcomes.
Definition 7. A mechanism is group strategy-proof for G ⊆ F if for any G¯ ⊆ G, there
does not exist a choice function profile C¯G¯ such that for outcomes A¯ = M(C¯G¯,CF\G¯) and
A =M(CF ) we have that Cf(A¯ ∪ A) = A¯ for every f ∈ G¯.
A mechanism is group strategy-proof for a group of agents if they cannot jointly ma-
nipulate their choice functions and obtain an outcome that is better for all of them. Like
Hatfield and Kominers (2012), we are only going to consider group strategy-proofness for
terminal agents. We generalize their Theorem 10 with the following result.
Proposition 5. Suppose that choice functions satisfy full substitutability and LAD/LAS
and, additionally, all terminal buyers (terminal sellers) demand at most one contract. Then
any mechanism that selects the buyer-optimal (seller-optimal) trail-stable outcome is group
strategy-proof for all terminal buyers.
As is well known, the assumptions that underpin Proposition 5—unit demands and ex-
treme one-sidedness—cannot be substantially relaxed (Hatfield and Kojima, 2009).
3.2 Trail-stable outcomes and comparative statics
The second set of properties of trail-stable outcomes concerns the effect of entry and exit
of new firms in the trading network. This type of comparative static analysis is well-studied in
two-sided matching markets (Gale and Sotomayor, 1985, Crawford, 1991, Blum et al., 1997,
Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005). More recently, Ostrovsky (2008) and Hatfield and Kominers
(2013) extended these results the case of supply chains.
First, let us consider what happens when a terminal seller is added to the market. More
formally, let F ′ = F∪{f ′} and let A′max and A
′
min be the buyer-optimal and the seller-optimal
trail-stable outcomes in F ′ respectively.
20Theorem 4 in Fleiner (2014), which states that any two stable flows agree on terminal contracts and
any two stable flows have the same number of assignments, is a further strengthening of Propositions 3 and
Propositions 4 in the special case of network flows.
21One design application of trading networks is a peer-to-peer electricity market in which many consumers
also generate electricity (Morstyn et al., 2018).
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Proposition 6. Suppose that choice functions satisfy full substitutability and IRC. Suppose
moreover that a new terminal seller f ′ whose choice function is fully substitutable and satisfies
IRC enters the market. Then
• every terminal seller f 6= f ′ prefers Amax to A
′
max and prefers Amin to A
′
min, and
• every terminal buyer f prefers A′max to Amax and prefers A
′
min to Amin.
22
Proposition 6 says that with a new seller, the seller-optimal outcome Amin and the buyer-
optimal outcome Amax move in the direction favorable to terminal buyers and unfavorable
to terminal sellers. Symmetrically, when a terminal buyer is added or if a seller leaves, Amin
and Amax move in the opposite direction. In other words, more competition on one end of
an industry is bad for the agents on that end and good for the agents on the other end.23
Proposition 6 generalizes Theorem 3 in Ostrovsky (2008).
Now consider the following market readjustment process: When the new terminal seller
f ′ enters, and we already have a trail-stable outcome A with corresponding fixed point
(X˙B, X˙S) then let X be the set of all contracts in the new network, and let us define
(X˙ ′B, X˙ ′S) = (X˙B, X˙S ∪ Xf ′). Operator Φ
′ acts on (X ′B, X ′S) using choice functions of
F ′. Let (XˆB, XˆS) be the fixed point of the iteration of fuction Φ, with associated outcome
Aˆ = XˆB ∩ XˆS which is the result of the market readjustment process.
Proposition 7. Suppose that choice functions satisfy full substitutability and IRC. Consider
a trail-stable outcome A with associated buyer and seller offer sets XB and XS. Suppose a
new terminal seller f ′ whose choice function is fully substitutable and satisfies IRC enters
the market and let Aˆ be the result of the market readjustment process. Then, all terminal
sellers prefer A to Aˆ and all terminal buyers (other than f ′) prefer Aˆ to A.24
An analogous result is obtained when terminal buyers and terminal sellers exit the market
so Proposition 7 generalizes the Theorem in Hatfield and Kominers (2013).
22The opposite holds when f ′ is a terminal buyer.
23It is also possible to prove an analogous result to Proposition 6 when choice function of terminal
agents expands under IRC and full substitutability. Choice function of a terminal agent Ĉf on 2X is an
expansion of choice function Cf on 2X if, for every Y ⊆ X , Ĉf (Y ) ⊆ Cf (Y ) (Echenique and Yenmez, 2015,
Chambers and Yenmez, 2017). Then suppose all choice functions satisfy full substitutability and IRC and
the choice function of one of the terminal buyers (sellers) expands. Then every terminal seller (buyer) prefers
the new buyer-optimal and seller-optimal trail-stable outcomes to the old ones and vice versa for the buyers
(sellers). This is a straightforward adaptation of Theorem 2 in (Chambers and Yenmez, 2017).
24The opposite holds when f ′ is a terminal buyer.
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4 Weak trail stability
As we saw in the previous section, the entire locally blocking trail does not need to
be acceptable for agents who are participating in the block. If contracts are not fulfilled
immediately, then it might be important to ensure that agents want to select all the contracts
along a blocking trail. Let us consider a trail T = {x1, ..., xM} whose elements are arranged
in a sequence (x1, ..., xM) and define T
≤m
f = {x1, ..., xm} ∩ Tf to be firm f ’s contracts out of
the first m contracts in the trail and T≥mf = {xm, ..., xM} ∩ Tf to be firm f ’s contracts out
of the last M −m+ 1 contracts in the trail (where m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}).
Definition 8. An outcome A ⊆ X is weakly trail-stable if
1. A is acceptable.
2. There is no trail T = {x1, x2, . . . , xM}, such that T ∩ A = ∅ and
(a) {x1} is (A, f1)-acceptable for f1 = s(x1) and
(b) At least one of the following two options holds:
i. T≤mfm is (A, fm)-acceptable for fm = b(xm−1) = s(xm) whenever 1 < m ≤ M ,
or
ii. T≥m−1fm is (A, fm)-acceptable for fm = b(xm−1) = s(xm) whenever 1 < m ≤M
(c) {xM} is (A, fM+1)-acceptable for fM+1 = b(xM ).
The above trail T is called a sequentially blocking trail to A.
The agents who are participating in a sequentially blocking trail need to choose all the
contracts in the trail whenever the trail “loops back” to them. As the sequentially blocking
trail grows, we ensure that each intermediate agent wants to choose all his contracts along
the trail. This ensures that the sequentially blocking trail is as a whole is selected by all
agents in the block. Therefore, weak trail stability might be a more suitable solution concept
for cases where contracts last longer or as a long-run prediction of outcomes. The next result
is immediate so we state it without proof.
Proposition 8. Suppose that choice functions satisfy IRC. Then any stable/chain-stable
outcome is weakly trail-stable.
The full substitutability assumption is not required for Proposition 8, but, of course, the
existence of stable or chain-stable outcome is not guaranteed in trading networks even under
full substitutability. On the other hand, without full substitutability, trail-stable outcomes
may not be weakly trail-stable as the following example shows.
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Example 3 (Trail stability does not imply weak trail stability without full substitutabil-
ity). Consider agents and contracts described in Example 1 and Figure 1. Agents have the
following preferences:
≻m : {w} ≻m ∅
≻i : {x} ≻i ∅
≻k : {z, y} ≻k ∅
≻j : {w, x, z, y} ≻j {w, z} ≻j ∅.
and other outcomes are not acceptable. The preferences of all agents, except j, are fully
substitutable. The empty set is a trail-stable outcome, but it is not weakly trail-stable since
{w, z, x, y} is a sequentially blocking trail when m makes the first offer.
However, under full substitutability trail-stable outcomes are always weakly trail-stable.
Proposition 9. Suppose that choice functions satisfy full substitutability and IRC. Then
any trail-stable outcome is weakly trail-stable.
The existence of weakly trail-stable outcomes under full substitutability is therefore an
immediate consequence of Theorem 1 and Proposition 9.
Corollary 1. Suppose that choice functions satisfy full substitutability and IRC. Then there
exists a weakly trail-stable outcome.
One may wonder whether under full substitutability trail-stable and weakly trail-stable
outcomes in fact coincide. This is not the case—the converse of Proposition 9 is false as the
next example shows.
Example 4 (Weakly trail-stable outcomes are not always trail-stable even under full sub-
stitutability). Consider agents and contracts described in Example 1 and Figure 1. Agents
have the following preferences that induce fully substitutable choice functions:
≻m : {w} ≻m ∅
≻i : {x} ≻i ∅
≻k : {z, y} ≻k ∅
≻j : {z, y} ≻j {w, z} ≻j {y, x} ≻j ∅.
and other outcomes are not acceptable. For outcome A = ∅, the trail {w, z, y, x} is locally
blocking trail but not trail-blocking. Therefore, weakly trail-stable outcomes are ∅ and {z, y}
but the only trail-stable outcome is {z, y}.
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Figure 3: Relationships between solution concepts in general trading networks. Solid line:
holds under IRC. Dashed line: holds under full substitutability and IRC. Dotted line: holds
under full substitutability, IRC, and LAD/LAS. Arrows show which propositions establish
the relationship and which examples examine the assumptions or the converse.
Therefore, under full substitutability, trail stability is a refinement of weak trail stability.
Figure 3 summarizes the relationships between various solution concepts in general trad-
ing networks that we have established in this paper. Stable and chain-stable outcomes may
not exist even under full substitutability and they are not equivalent without the additional
LAD/LAS assumption (see Example 1 in Hatfield et al., 2015).
5 Conclusion
Stability is an appealing solution concept, but in general trading networks stable out-
comes may not exist. In this paper, we introduced a new solution concept for general trading
networks, called trail stability. We showed that any trading network has a trail-stable out-
come when choice functions are fully substitutable. Indeed, full substitutability is crucial
for existence of trail-stable outcomes since previous maximal domain results for many-to-
many matching markets apply in our case (see, for example, Hatfield and Kominers (2012,
Theorem 6) and Hatfield and Kominers (2017, Theorem 2)).25 Trail-stable outcomes have
a natural lattice structure and inherit a host of properties studied in two-sided and supply-
chain settings. We also considered an alternative solution concept—weak trail stability—
which is implied by trail stability under full substitutability. Trail stability is a attractive
solution concept for trading networks: in a version of our model with continuous prices,
Fleiner, Jagadeesan, Jankó, and Teytelboym (2018) show that competitive equilibrium out-
comes are trail-stable and under full substitutability essentially any trail-stable outcome can
be supported by competitive equilibrium prices.
There are at least four fruitful areas for further research. The first would be to ex-
25When firms have quasilinear utility functions, (full) substitutability is not necessary for competitive
equilibrium and even when all agents have complementary preferences competitive equilibrium may exist
(Baldwin and Klemperer, 2015, Drexl, 2013, Hatfield and Kominers, 2015, Teytelboym, 2014).
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amine the structure of weakly trail-stable outcomes. Second, one might look for weaker
sufficient conditions on preferences to establish the coincidence between weakly trail-stable,
trail-stable, stable outcomes (Appendix C). Third, it would be interesting to find more mar-
ket design applications of our model (Morstyn et al., 2018). Finally, it would be useful to
understand how our model can be tested and estimated empirically (Fox, 2017).
19
A Relationship to previous work
General
networks
General choice
functions
Existence
and
structure
New solution
concepts used
Ostrovsky (2008) ✗
acyclic
✓ ✓ Chain-stable
Westkamp (2010) ✗
acyclic
✓ ✓ Group-stable,
Core
Hatfield and Kominers (2012) ✗
acyclic
✓ ✓ Stable
Hatfield et al. (2013),
Hatfield and Kominers (2015)
✓ ✗
quasilinear (TU)
✓ Strong
group-stable
Hatfield et al. (2015) ✓ ✓ ✗ Chain-stable
This paper ✓ ✓ ✓ Trail-stable
Weakly
trail-stable
Figure 4: Relationship to previous work.
Paper Theorem Description Generalization in this paper
Ostrovsky (2008) Theorem 1 Existence of stable
outcomes
Theorem 1 and Proposition 1
Ostrovsky (2008);
Hatfield and Kominers (2012)
Theorem 2;
Theorem 4
Buyer- and
seller-optimality
Proposition 2 and
Proposition 3
Hatfield and Kominers (2012) Theorem 8 Rural hospitals theorem Proposition 4
Hatfield and Kominers (2012) Theorem 10 Strategy-proofness Proposition 5
Ostrovsky (2008) Theorem 3 Firm entry Proposition 6
Hatfield and Kominers (2013) Theorem Vacancy chain
dynamics
Proposition 7
Figure 5: Previous results generalized in this paper to a trading network setting with general
choice functions.
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B Proofs
We first prove Theorem 1 on the existence of trail-stable outcomes. We then prove
Propositions 2 and 3—these are the most technically challenging results.
The lattice structure of trail-stable outcomes immediately gives the rural hospitals the-
orem and the strategyproofness result for terminal agents (Propositions 4 and 5). Then we
prove Propositions 6 and 7 which examine comparative statics of trail-stable outcomes.
Finally, we prove Propositions 1, 9, 10, and 11 which describe the relationships between
stable, trail-stable, and weakly trail-stable outcomes (proof of Proposition 8 is immediate).
Note that we sometimes refer to singleton sets of contracts {x} as “contract x” to avoid
saying “a set containing contract x”.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Consider Y B and ZS, which are subsets of X, and represent sets of available upstream
and downstream contracts for all agents, respectively. Define a lattice L with the ground set
X ×X with an order ⊑ such that (Y B, ZS) ⊑ (Y ′B, Z ′S) if Y B ⊆ Y ′B and ZS ⊇ Z ′S.
Furthermore, define a mapping Φ as follows:
ΦB(Y
B, ZS) = X \RS(Z
S|Y B)
ΦS(Y
B, ZS) = X \RB(Y
B|ZS)
Φ(Y B, ZS) = (ΦB(Y
B, ZS),ΦS(Y
B, ZS))
where RS(Z
S|Y B) =
⋃
f∈F R
f
S(Z
S|Y B) and RB(Y
B|ZS) =
⋃
f∈F R
f
B(Y
B|ZS). Clearly, Φ
is isotone (Fleiner, 2003, Ostrovsky, 2008, Hatfield and Kominers, 2012) on L. We rely on
the following well-known fixed point theorem of Tarski.
Theorem B.1. (Tarski, 1955) Let L be a complete lattice and let Φ : L→ L be an isotone
mapping. Then the set of fixed points of Φ in L is also a complete lattice.
Subsequent to the circulation of the first draft of this paper, Adachi (2017) gave an
alternative proof of this Theorem 1 using the T -operator defined by Ostrovsky (2008).
Proof of Theorem 1. Existence of fixed-points of Φ follows from Theorem B.1 since (X ×X,⊑)
is a complete lattice.26
We claim that every fixed point (X˙B, X˙S) of Φ corresponds to an outcome X˙B ∩ X˙S = A
that is trail-stable. First, we show that A is acceptable. We claim that if (X˙B, X˙S) is a fixed
point then X˙S ∪ X˙B = X. To see this suppose for contradiction that there is a contract
x /∈ X˙S ∪ X˙B. Then x /∈ RS(X˙
S|X˙B) therefore x ∈ X \ RS(X˙
S|X˙B) = X˙B. So it must be
that x ∈ X˙S ∪ X˙B. This implies that RS(X˙
S|X˙B) = X \ X˙B = X˙S \A so CS(X˙
S|X˙B) = A
and similarly CB(X˙
B|X˙S) = A. From this, we can see that A is acceptable.
Second, we show that A is trail-stable. This is similar to Step 1 of the Proof of Lemma 1
in Ostrovsky (2008). Suppose that T = {x1, . . . , xM} is a locally blocking trail and assume
towards a contradiction that T ∩ A = ∅. Since we have that x1 ∈ C
s(x1)
S (A ∪ {x1}|A),
26Hence, we do not actually require the assumption of the finiteness of contracts as long as lattice L is
appropriately defined. However, we maintain this assumption for ease of comparison with previous results.
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we must have that x1 ∈ C
s(x1)
S (X˙
S ∪ {x1}|A). Since if C
s(x1)
S (X˙
S ∪ {x1}|A) ⊆ X˙
S then
by IRC C
s(x1)
S (X˙
S ∪ {x1}|A) = A, therefore C
s(x1)
S (A ∪ {x1}|A) = A. We also have that
x1 ∈ C
s(x1)
S (X˙
S ∪ {x1}|X˙
B) by CSC. If x1 ∈ X˙
S, then x1 ∈ X˙
B = X \RS(X˙
S|X˙B). But we
assumed that x1 /∈ A, so x1 ∈ X˙
B.
Now, consider x2. By definition of a locally blocking trail, we have that x2 ∈ C
s(x2)
S (A ∪
{x2}|A ∪ {x1}). Once again by full substitutability and IRC, we obtain that and x2 ∈
C
s(x2)
S (X˙
S ∪ {x2}|X˙
B ∪ {x1}). If x2 ∈ X˙
S, then x2 ∈ X˙
B = X \ RS(X˙
S|X˙B). But we
assumed that x2 /∈ A, so x2 ∈ X˙
B. Now proceed by induction, we show that every x ∈ T
is in X˙B. Consider the last contract xM . Since xm ∈ C
b(xM )
B (A ∪ xM |A), using the same
argument we had for x1, we get that xM ∈ X˙
S. A contradiction.
Now we show that every trail-stable outcome corresponds to a fixed point.
Suppose A is trail-stable. For every xi /∈ A, if there exists a trail {x1, x2, . . . , xi} such
that
• {x1} is (A, s(x1))-acceptable, and
• {xm−1, xm} is (A, fm)-acceptable for fm = b(xm−1) = s(xm) whenever 1 < m ≤ i,
then let xi ∈ X
B
0 . Otherwise, let xi ∈ X
S
0 . Let X˙
B = A ∪XB0 and X˙
S = A ∪XS0 . Clearly
X˙S ∪ X˙B = X.
Outcome A is acceptable, so Cf(A) = Af for all f ∈ F . For every firm f , if f = s(x)
and x ∈ X˙S \ A then x /∈ Cf (A ∪ {x}) otherwise x would be in X˙B. By SSS, we have that
CfS(X˙
S|A) = A. And if f = b(y) and y ∈ X˙B \ A then y /∈ Cf(A ∪ {y}) otherwise the trail
ending in y would be a locally blocking trail. By SSS, we then also have that CfB(X˙
B|A) = A.
Moreover, {x, y} * Cf(A ∪ {x, y}) otherwise x would be in X˙B. Putting these statements
together, we have that CS(X˙
S|X˙B) = A and CB(X˙
B|X˙S) = A. Therefore RS(X˙
S|X˙B) =
X˙S \ A, RB(X˙
B|X˙S) = X˙B \ A, so X \RS(X˙
S|X˙B) = X˙B, X \RB(X˙
B|X˙S) = X˙S.
B.2 Proofs of Propositions 2 and 3
First, we prove that fixed points of an operator Φ (defined below) form a complete sub-
lattice (Sublattice Theorem B.3) extending Theorems 7.3 and 7.5 from Fleiner (2003). Then
we show two lattice properties for the terminal agents (Terminal Sublattice Theorem B.4 and
Terminal Superiority Lemma B.6). We then use these three results to prove Propositions 2
and 3.
B.2.1 The sublattice property of fixed points
First note an immediate implication of the Laws of Aggregate Demand and Supply
(LAD/LAS) that we have already noted in the proof of Lemma 1. If the choice functions
of firm f satisfy LAD/LAS, for sets of contracts Y ′ ⊆ Y ⊆ XBf , and Z ⊆ Z
′ ⊆ XSf (i.e.
(Y ′, Z ′) ⊑ (Y, Z)) then |CfB(Y
′|Z ′)| − |CfS(Z
′|Y ′)| ≤ |CfB(Y |Z)| − |C
f
S(Z|Y )|.
For every firm f we define a weight function on the contracts in Xf , namely let w(x) = 1
if x ∈ XBf and w(x) = −1 if x ∈ X
S
f . So w(C
f(Y, Z)) = |CfB(Y |Z)|−|C
f
S(Z|Y )|.
27 Therefore
if Cf satisfies LAD/LAS, then (Y ′, Z ′) ⊑ (Y, Z) implies w(Cf(Y ′, Z ′)) ≤ w(Cf(Y, Z)).
27The weight function can be defined more generally, see Fleiner (2003).
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Let Y and Y ′ be subsets of XBf , Z and Z
′ are subsets of XSf . We denote the complement
of Z in XSf with Z = X
S
f \Z. Define the operation (Y, Z)\˜(Y
′, Z ′) = (Y \ Y ′, Z ′ \ Z). For a
given firm f , we call a set function R : 2Xf → 2
X
f a w-contraction if for every (Y
′, Z ′) ⊑ (Y, Z)
pair, w(R(Y, Z)\˜R(Y ′, Z ′)) ≤ w((Y, Z)\˜(Y ′, Z ′))
Let us describe some properties of this \˜ operation:
Lemma B.1. For a firm f , let Y and Y ′ be subsets of XBf , Z and Z
′ are subsets of XSf such
that (Y ′, Z ′) ⊑ (Y, Z). Then the following statements hold:
1. w((Y, Z)\˜(Y ′, Z ′)) = w((Y, Z))− w((Y ′, Z ′))− |XSf |.
2. For any (A,B) pair, w((A,B)\˜(Y, Z)) ≤ w((A,B)\˜(Y ′, Z ′)).
3. If (Y, Z) ⊑ (A,B) then the w((A,B)\˜(Y, Z)) = w((A,B)\˜(Y ′, Z ′)) equality implies
(Y ′, Z ′) = (Y, Z).
Proof of Lemma B.1. Let us tackle each statement separately:
1. w((Y, Z)\˜(Y ′, Z ′)) = |Y \ Y ′| − |Z ′ \ Z| = |Y | − |Y ′| − |XSf |+ |Z
′| − |Z| = w((Y, Z))−
w((Y ′, Z ′))− |XSf |.
2. Since Y ⊇ Y ′, this implies A\Y ⊆ A\Y ′, and similarly Z ⊆ Z ′ gives us Z \B ⊆ Z ′\B,
so Z \B ⊇ Z ′ \B, therefore w((A,B)\˜(Y, Z)) = |A\Y |−|Z \B| ≤ |A\Y ′|−|Z ′ \B| =
w((A,B)\˜(Y ′, Z ′))
3. If w((A,B)\˜(Y, Z)) = w((A,B)\˜(Y ′, Z ′)) then equality must hold at |A \Y | = |A \Y ′|
and |Z \B| = |Z ′ \B|. Since Y ′ ⊆ Y ⊆ A and Z ′ ⊇ Z ⊇ B, we get that Y = Y ′ and
Z = Z ′.
Lemma B.2. Suppose that the choice function of f ∈ F satisfies full substitutability and
LAD/LAS. Then the rejection function Rf is ⊑-isotone and a w-contraction.
Proof of Lemma B.2. Let Y and Y ′ be subsets of XBf and Z and Z
′ are be of XSf , and
moreover let (Y ′, Z ′) ⊑ (Y, Z).
We have seen earlier that Rf is ⊑-isotone, so Rf(Y ′, Z ′) ⊑ Rf(Y, Z). To prove that it is
w-contraction, w(Rf(Y, Z)\˜Rf(Y ′, Z ′)) + |XSf | = w(R
f(Y, Z))− w(Rf(Y ′, Z ′)) = w((Y, Z) \
Cf(Y, Z))−w((Y ′, Z ′) \Cf(Y ′, Z ′)) = w(Y, Z)−w(Cf(Y, Z))−w(Y ′, Z ′)+w(Cf(Y ′, Z ′)) ≤
w(Y, Z)−w(Y ′, Z ′) = w((Y, Z)\˜(Y ′, Z ′))+|XSf |. We used that w(C
f(Y ′, Z ′)) ≤ w(Cf(Y, Z)).
If we subtract |XSf | from both sides, we get that
w(Rf(Y, Z)\˜Rf (Y ′, Z ′)) ≤ w((Y, Z)\˜(Y ′, Z ′)), so Rf is indeed a w-contraction.
We will work on the (2(X,X), ∪˜ , ∩˜ ) lattice. We can imagine it as a network that contains
exactly two (unrelated) copies of each contract (two half-contracts), one for the buyer and
one for the seller of the contract.
Now the Cf choice functions of the firms are defined over disjoint set of contracts, so for
every Y ⊆ (X,X) we can define C(Y ) =
⋃
f∈F C
f(Yf). Similarly R(Y ) =
⋃
f∈F R
f(Yf). On
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this whole network, we call a set function R : 2(X,X) → 2(X,X) a w-contraction if for every
firm f the corresponding Rf was a w-contraction.
Let us denote the set of the starting half-contracts (seller’s side) withXSF =
⋃
f∈F X
S
f , and
the set of ending half-contracts (buyer’s side) withXBF =
⋃
f∈F X
B
f . Now |X
S
F | = |X
B
F | = |X|.
Let Y ⊆ XBF and Z ⊆ X
S
F . The dual of (Y, Z) is what we get by switching the two parts.
We denote it with (Y, Z)∗ = (Z, Y ).
In this model let all the contracts in XSF have weight w = −1 and all contracts in X
B
F
have weight w = 1.
Lemma B.3. If F : 2(X,X) → 2(X,X) is ⊑-isotone and a w-contraction then fixed points of
F form a nonempty sublattice of (2(X,X), ∪˜, ∩˜).
Proof of Lemma B.3. By Theorem B.1, the set of fixed points is nonempty. Now let U ⊆
(X,X) and V ⊆ (X,X). Assume that F (U) = U and F (V ) = V . By monotonicity,
U ∩˜V = F (U) ∩˜F (V ) ⊒ F (U ∩˜V ) and U ∪˜V = F (U) ∪˜F (V ) ⊑ F (U ∩˜V ). From the
w-contraction property and Lemma B.1, we have that
w(U \˜(U ∩˜V )) ≥ w(F (U)\˜F (U ∩˜V )) ≥ w(U \˜(U ∩˜V )),
w((U ∪˜V )\˜U) ≥ w(F (U ∪˜V )\˜F (U)) ≥ w((U ∪˜V )\˜U),
hence an equality must hold throughout. Using the third part of Lemma B.1 we can see that
(U ∩˜V ) = F (U ∩˜V ) and (U ∪˜V ) = F (U ∪˜V ) so they are also fixed points of F .
Observation B.2. Consider two sets of contracts (Y, Z) and (Y ′, Z ′) , where Y, Y ′ ⊆ XBF
and Z,Z ′ ⊆ XSF and (X,X) \ (Y, Z) = (X \Y,X \Z). If (Y
′, Z ′) ⊑ (Y, Z), then ((X \Y,X \
Z)∗\˜(X \ Y ′, X \ Z ′)∗) = ((X \ Z) \ (X \ Z ′), (X \ Y ′) \ (X \ Y )) = ((Z ′ \ Z), (Y \ Y ′)) =
((X,X) \ ((Y, Z)\˜(Y ′, Z ′))∗.
Theorem B.3 (Sublattice Theorem). Suppose that choice functions satisfy full substi-
tutability and LAD/LAS. Then the fixed points of Φ(Y, Z) = (X \RS(Z|Y ), X \RB(Y |Z))
form a nonempty, complete sublattice of (2X × 2X , ∪˜, ∩˜).
Proof of Theorem B.3. The Φ(Y, Z) = (X \ RS(Z|Y ), X \ RB(Y |Z)) function can be also
written as Φ(Y ) = ((X,X) \ R(Y, Z))∗. Since R is ⊑-isotone, Φ is also ⊑-isotone. We
need to show that Φ is a w-contraction. Suppose that (Y ′, Z ′) ⊑ (Y, Z). Using Observation
B.2, w(Φ(Y, Z)\˜Φ(Y ′, Z ′)) = w(((X,X) \ R(Y, Z))∗\˜((X,X) \ R(Y ′, Z ′))∗) = w(((X,X) \
(R(Y, Z)\˜R(Y ′, Z ′)))∗) = w(R(Y, Z)\˜R(Y ′, Z ′)) ≤ w((Y, Z)\˜(Y ′, Z ′)) because in Lemma B.2
we showed that R is a w-contraction.
Since Φ is ⊑-isotone and a w-contraction, Lemma B.3 gives that the fixed points of Φ
form a sublattice of (2(X,X), ∪˜, ∩˜).
B.2.2 Lattice for the terminal agents
The following path independence condition was introduced by Aizerman and Malishevski
(1981). It has been deeply explored in many-to-one matching markets by Echenique and Yenmez
(2015) and in many-to-many matching markets by Fleiner (2003) and Chambers and Yenmez
(2017).
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Lemma B.4. (Path Independence) If choice function Cf : 2X → 2X is same-side substi-
tutable and satisfies IRC then Cf(Y ∪ Z) = Cf (Y ∪ Cf(Z)) holds for Y, Z ⊆ X.
Proof of Lemma B.4. Since Cf is same-side substitutable, Cf(Y ∪Z) ⊆ (Y ∪Cf (Z)). Using
IRC we have that Cf(Y ∪ Z) ⊆ (Y ∪ Cf(Z)) ⊆ (Y ∪ Z) implies that Cf(Y ∪ Z) = Cf (Y ∪
Cf(Z)).
Lemma B.5. Suppose that choice functions satisfy full substitutability and IRC. Then
terminal superiority is a partial order on terminal-trail-stable outcomes.
Proof of Lemma B.5. We need to prove that S is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive.
Assume that A,A′ and A′′ are acceptable outcomes. As Cf(Af ∪Af ) = C
f(Af ) = Af holds
for each agent (and hence for each terminal seller) f , relationS is reflexive. If A S A′ S A
then we have Af = C
f(Af ∪ A
′
f) = A
′
f holds for any terminal agent f , hence A = A
′ and
S is antisymmetric. For transitivity, assume that A S A′ S A′′. Using this and Lemma
B.4, we get for any terminal agent f that
Cf(Af∪A
′′
f ) = C
f(Cf(Af∪A
′
f )∪A
′′
f ) = C
f(Af∪A
′
f∪A
′′
f ) = C
f(Af∪C
f (A′f∪A
′′
f )) = C
f (Af∪A
′
f ) = Af ,
hence A S A′′ indeed holds. This completes the proof.
Theorem B.4 (Terminal Sublattice Theorem). If L is a nonempty complete sublattice of
(2X × 2X , ∪˜, ∩˜) then LT = {(YT , ZT ) : (Y, Z) ∈ L} is a sublattice of (2
T × 2T , ∪˜, ∩˜).
Proof of Theorem B.4. For a given (AT , BT ) there can be more than one inverse image in the
original lattice. Let (A∗, B∗) =
⋃˜
{(Y, Z) ∈ L : (YT , ZT ) ⊑ (AT , BT )}. Since L is a complete
lattice with lattice operations ∪˜ and ∩˜, this means (A∗, B∗) ∈ L and (A∗T , B
∗
T ) = (AT , BT ).
We call it the canonical inverse image of (AT , BT ), since this is the ⊑-greatest among all
inverse images.
If (AT , BT ) and (CT , DT ) ∈ LT , let us consider (Y, Z) = (A
∗, B∗) ∩˜ (C∗, D∗). Since
(Y, Z) ⊑ (A∗, B∗) this implies (YT , ZT ) ⊑ (A
∗
T , B
∗
T ) = (AT , BT ). Similarly (YT , ZT ) ⊑
(CT , DT ). We want to show that (YT , ZT ) is the greatest lower bound of (AT , BT ) and
(CT , DT ) in LT . We can see that (Y
∗, Z∗) ⊑ (A∗, B∗) and (Y ∗, Z∗) ⊑ (C∗, D∗) because
(A∗, B∗) is defined by the union of a greater set. Therefore (Y ∗, Z∗) = (Y, Z).
Suppose there exists a (ET , FT ) ∈ LT such that (ET , FT ) ⊑ (AT , BT ) and (ET , FT ) ⊑
(CT , DT ) but (ET , FT ) 6⊑ (YT , ZT ). Then in the original lattice (E
∗, F ∗) ⊑ (A∗, B∗) and
(E∗, F ∗) ⊑ (C∗, D∗) but (E∗, F ∗) 6⊑ (Y ∗, Z∗). But this is impossible since (Y, Z) = (A∗, B∗) ∩˜ (C∗, D∗).
So we have found a unique greatest common lower bound of (AT , BT ) and (CT , DT ).
Similar argument can be made in order to find the lowest common upper bound of
(AT , BT ) and (CT , DT ). Let (Y, Z) = (A
∗, B∗) ∪˜ (C∗, D∗). Since (Y, Z) ⊒ (A∗, B∗) this
implies (YT , ZT ) ⊒ (A
∗
T , B
∗
T ) = (AT , BT ). Similarly (YT , ZT ) ⊒ (CT , DT ).
Suppose there exists a (ET , FT ) ∈ LT such that (ET , FT ) ⊒ (AT , BT ) and (ET , FT ) ⊒
(CT , DT ) but (ET , FT ) 6⊒ (YT , ZT ). Then in the original lattice (E
∗, F ∗) ⊒ (A∗, B∗) and
(E∗, F ∗) ⊒ (C∗, D∗) therefore (E∗, F ∗) ⊒ (Y, Z), so (E∗T , F
∗
T ) = (ET , FT ) ⊒ (YT , ZT ), which
is a contradiction.
So we have found a unique lowest common upper bound of (AT , BT ) and (CT , DT ), so
(LT , ∪˜, ∩˜) is indeed a lattice.
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Now we consider only the contracts sold by the terminal sellers. For any Y ⊆ X, let
YS = {x ∈ Y |s(x) ∈ T }.
Given two trail-stable outcomes A and A′, let us denote the canonical trail-stable pair
(defined as at the end of Proof of Theorem 1) for A with X˙B and X˙S, and the canonical
trail-stable pair for A′ with X˙ ′B and X˙ ′S.
Lemma B.6 (Terminal Superiority Lemma). Given two trail-stable outcomes A and A′,
Cf(Af ∪ A
′
f ) = Af for each teminal seller if and only if X˙
S
S ⊇ X˙
′S
S and X˙
B
S ⊆ X˙
′B
S holds. A
similar statement holds for terminal buyers.
Proof of Lemma B.6. If f is a terminal seller, Cf(X˙S) = Af and C
f (X˙ ′S) = A′f . Suppose
that X˙SS ⊇ X˙
′S
S . By IRC, Af ⊆ Af ∪ A
′
f ⊆ X˙
S
f implies that C
f(Af ∪ A
′
f) = Af .
For the opposite direction, take a contract x ∈ Xf such that x /∈ C
f(A′f ∪ x). We use
Lemma B.5, A S A′ S x, therefore A S x, so x /∈ Cf(Af ∪ {x}). When we define the
stable pairs for A and A′, if x ∈ Cf(A′f ∪ {x}) then x ∈ X˙
B, if x /∈ Cf (A′f ∪ {x}) then
x ∈ X˙S. From the previous observation we can see that X˙SS ⊇ X˙
′S
S and X˙
B
S ⊆ X˙
′B
S . The
proof for terminal buyers is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 2. In the proof of Theorem 1 we have seen that any fixed point (X˙B, X˙S)
of isotone mapping Φ on lattice L determines a trail-stable outcome AX . Moreover, each
trail-stable outcome A corresponds to at least one fixed point (X˙B, X˙S) of Φ. From Theorem
B.1, it follows that fixed points of Φ form a lattice, hence there is a ⊑-minimal fixed point
(Y˙ B, Y˙ S) and a ⊑-maximal one (Z˙B, Z˙S). We show that trail-stable outcome AY is seller-
optimal and AZ is buyer-optimal. So assume that A = AX is a trail-stable outcome. As
(Y˙ B, Y˙ S) ⊑ (X˙B, X˙S) ⊑ (Z˙B, Z˙S), we have Y˙ B ⊆ X˙B ⊆ Z˙B and Y˙ S ⊇ X˙S ⊇ Z˙S. Lemma
B.6 implies that Cf(Af ∪ A
Y
f ) = A
Y
f and C
f(Af ∪ A
Z
f ) = Af for any terminal seller f and
Cg(Ag ∪ A
Y
g ) = Ag and Cg(Ag ∪ A
Z
g ) = A
Z
g for any terminal buyer g. So, by definition A is
seller-superior to AY and AZ is seller-superior to A.
Proof of Proposition 3. In the proof of Theorem 1 we have seen that A is trail-stable if and
only if there is canonical trail-stable pair (X˙B, X˙S) such that (X˙B, X˙S) is a fixed point of
isotone mapping Φ and A = X˙B ∩ X˙S. Moreover, if the choice functions satisfy LAD/LAS,
then fixed points of Φ form a sublattice L of (2X×2X , ∪˜, ∩˜) by Theorem B.3. From Theorem
B.4, the projection of the above lattice to the terminals, LT is also a lattice under ⊑ and
from Lemma B.6 this partial order coincides with S. Therefore, the trail-stable outcomes
form a lattice under terminal-superiority.
B.3 Proofs of Propositions 4 and 5
Proof of Proposition 4. Follow the proof of Theorem 8 in Hatfield and Kominers (2012)
word-for-word, only replacing “stable” with “trail-stable”.
Proof of Proposition 5. Follow the proof of Theorem 1 in Hatfield and Kojima (2009) (which
was pointed out by Hatfield and Kominers (2012) for stable outcomes in supply chains).
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B.4 Proofs of Propositions 6 and 7
Our proof follows Ostrovsky (2008). First we investigate the restabilized outcome from
A, which we play part in the proofs of both Propositions 6 and 7. Let A be an arbitrary
trail-stable outcome in the original network, with a corresponding canonical trail-stable pair
(X˙B, X˙S). After the new terminal seller f ′ arrives, let X be the set of all contracts in the
new network, and let us define (X∗B, X∗S) = (X˙B, X˙S ∪Xf ′). In the following, we will use
Φ according to the choice fuctions on the new network, so (X˙B, X˙S) does not need to be a
fixed point of Φ anymore.
SinceXf ′∩X
∗B = ∅, for every firm f 6= f ′, RfS(X
∗S|X∗B) = RfS(X˙
S|X˙B) andRfB(X
∗B|X∗S) =
RfB(X˙
B|X˙S). For example, if f has a conctracts with f ′, contract x = f ′f was not offered
for firm f in X∗B so it does not get rejected.
For firm f ′, Rf
′
S (X
∗S|X∗B) = Xf ′ \ C
f ′
S (Xf ′) and R
f ′
B (X
∗B|X∗S) = ∅.
Therefore Φ(X∗B, X∗S) = (X˙B ∪ Cf
′
(Xf ′), X˙
S ∪Xf ′).
So (X∗B, X∗S) ⊑ Φ(X∗B, X∗S), and Φ is ⊑-isotone, so Φ(X∗B, X∗S) ⊑ Φ(Φ(X∗B , X∗S))
and so on. The lattice of all possible subset-pairs is finite, so there is a k such that
Φk(X∗B, X∗S) = (XˆB, XˆS) is a fixed point. So (X∗B, X∗S) ⊑ Φ(X∗B, X∗S) ⊑ Φk(X∗B, X∗S) =
(XˆB, XˆS). Outcome Aˆ = XˆB ∩ XˆS is trail-stable, and this is what we call the restabilized
outcome from A.
Proof of Proposition 6. If f ′ is a terminal seller, and we start from outcome Amax and the ⊑-
maximal pair (Z˙B, Z˙S). Using the previous method, outcome Aˆ = ZˆB∩ZˆS is the restabilized
outcome from A. In the new network there exists a ⊑-maximal fixed point of Φ, namely
(Z ′B, Z ′S), therefore (Z˙B, Z˙S ∪Xf ′) = (Z
∗B, Z∗S) ⊑ (ZˆB, ZˆS) ⊑ (Z ′B, Z ′S). The trail-stable
outcome corresponding to the maximal fixed point is A′max = Z
′B ∩ Z ′S. We have to show
that A′max is better for terminal buyers and worse for terminal sellers than the original Amax.
If f is a terminal buyer, since (Z ′B, Z ′S) is fixed point of Φ and (Z˙B, Z˙S) was fixed before
the new agent arrived, Cf(Z ′B) = A′f,max and C
f (Z∗B) = Af,max and Z
∗B ⊆ Z ′B so from
Cf(Z ′B) ⊆ (Af,max ∪ A
′
f,max) ⊆ Z
′B by IRC we obtain Cf(Af,max ∪ A
′
f,max) = A
′
f,max so
A′f,max is preferred by terminal buyers.
Similarly, if f is a terminal seller outside f ′, Cf(Z ′S) = A′f,max and C
f (Z∗S) = Af,max
and Z ′S ⊆ Z∗S so from Cf(Z∗S) ⊆ (Af,max ∪ A
′
f,max) ⊆ Z
∗S by IRC we obtain Cf (Af,max ∪
A′f,max) = Af,max so Af,max is preferred by terminal buyers. If f
′ is a terminal buyer then we
can use the same proof with reversing the roles of buyers and sellers.
Proof of Proposition 7. If f ′ is a terminal seller, and A is any trail-stable outcome in the
original network, with canonical trail-stable pair (X˙B, X˙S), then (X∗B, X∗S) = (X˙B, X˙S ∪
Xf ′) ⊑ (Xˆ
B, XˆS). The restabilized outcome is Aˆ = XˆB ∩ XˆS, and similarly to the proof of
Proposition 6 one can show that initial producers weakly prefer A to Aˆ and all end consumers
(other than f ′) prefer Aˆ to A. If f ′ is a terminal buyer, preferences are the opposite.
B.5 Proofs of Propositions 1, 9, 10, and 11
The following lemma shows that if a locally blocking trail intersects an agent several
times, but he doesn’t want to pick every contract in the locally blocking trail, then the agent
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will still select any of his upstream (downstream) contracts alongside some another one of
his downstream (upstream) contracts in the locally blocking trail.
Lemma B.7. Suppose that choice functions satisfy full substitutability and IRC. Moreover,
consider a set of contracts Y ⊂ X and a set of contracts {x1, x2, . . . , xk, z1, z2, . . . , zk} for
agent f .
1. Assume that Y is acceptable and x1, x2, . . . , xk ∈ X
B
f and z1, z2, . . . , zk ∈ X
S
f such that
{xi, zi} is a (Y, f)-essential pair for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k, but {x1, x2, . . . , xk, z1, z2, . . . , zk} is
not (Y, f)-acceptable. Then {xi, zj} is a (Y, f)-essential pair for some i 6= j.
2. Now let’s remove contract x1. Assume that Y is acceptable and x2, . . . , xk ∈ X
B
f and
z1, z2, . . . , zk ∈ X
S
f such that z1 is (Y, f)-acceptable, {xi, zi} is a (Y, f)-essential pair
for any 2 ≤ i ≤ k, but {x2, . . . , xk, z1, z2, . . . , zk} is not (Y, f)-acceptable. Then {xi, zj}
is a (Y, f)-essential pair for some i 6= j.
3. Now let’s remove contracts x1 and zk. Assume that Y is acceptable and x2, . . . , xk ∈ X
B
f
and z1, z2, . . . , zk−1 ∈ X
S
f such that z1 and xk are (Y, f)-acceptable, {xi, zi} is a (Y, f)-
essential pair for any 2 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, but {x2, . . . , xk, z1, z2, . . . , zk−1} is not (Y, f)-
acceptable. Then {xi, zj} 6= {xk, z1} is a (Y, f)-essential pair for some i 6= j.
Proof of Lemma B.7. We proof each statement in turn.
1. Suppose, for example, that zj /∈ C
f(Y ∪ {x1, x2, . . . , xk, z1, z2, . . . , zk}) for some j.
Then from CSC, zj /∈ C
f (Y ∪ {xj, z1, z2, . . . , zk}). But xj ∈ C
f(Y ∪ {xj, zj}) because
{xj , zj} is (Y, f)-essential by assumption so from CSC we must have that xj ∈ C
f (Y ∪
{xj , z1, z2, . . . , zk}). Since {xj} is not (Y, f)-acceptable, there must be a zl ∈ C
f (Y ∪
{xj , z1, z2, . . . , zk}) so that {xj , zl} is (Y, f)-acceptable for some l 6= j.
2. In the case that x1 has been removed, suppose that z1 /∈ C
f(Y ∪{x2, . . . , xk, z1, z2, . . . , zk}).
Then, by CSC, we must have that z1 /∈ C
f (Y ∪{z1, z2, . . . , zk}) but this cannot hold if
{z1} is (Y, f)-acceptable but none of the other {zj} contracts are (Y, f)-acceptable by
IRC and SSS. Therefore, it must be that either xj or zj (for 2 ≤ j ≤ k) is not chosen
by Cf (Y ∪ {x2, . . . , xk, z1, z2, . . . , zk}). Following the argument in Part 1 above, there
must be an (Y, f)-essential pair {xi, zj}.
3. Repeat the argument in Part 2.
Before we prove Proposition 1, we will introduce a useful concept.
Definition B.1. A non-empty set of contracts Q is a circuit if its elements can be arranged
in some order (x1, . . . , xM) such that b(xm) = s(xm+1) holds for all m ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1} and
b(xM ) = s(x1) where M = |Q|.
Proof of Proposition 1. To show that every stable outcome is trail-stable consider, towards
a contradiction, a stable outcome A which is not trail-stable. Pick a locally blocking trail
T . For every firm involved in T , if Tf * Cf(A ∪ Tf ), then using Lemma B.7 there is a
upstream-downstream pairs of contracts xj ∈ T and zl ∈ T such that j 6= l and {xj , zl} is
(A, f)-acceptable. Select only these essential pairs and remove the other contracts. Note that
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the contracts that remain still form a locally blocking trail. Continue removing contracts
by applying Lemma B.7 to the locally blocking trail until the remaining locally blocking
trail forms circuit Z such that Zf ⊆ C
f(A ∪ Zf) for every firm f . This circuit is therefore
a blocking set. Since T ∩ A = ∅ and Z ⊆ T , Z ∩ A = ∅. Therefore A is not stable, a
contradiction.
Lemma B.8. Suppose that choice functions satisfy full substitutability and IRC. If Y and
Z are disjoint sets of contracts and f is an agent such that Zf is (Y, f)-acceptable then for
any contract z of ZBf one of the following options hold:
1. {z} is (Y, f)-acceptable, or
2. there exists some z′ ∈ ZSf such that {z, z
′} is a (Y, f)-acceptable pair, or
3. there are z1, z2, . . . , zk ∈ Z
S
f such that both {z, z1, z2, . . . , zk} and {zi} (for 1 ≤ i ≤ k)
are (Y, f)-acceptable.
For z ∈ ZSf an analogous statement holds.
Proof of Lemma B.8. We can suppose without loss of generality that z ∈ XBf .
1. From SSS, it follows that z ∈ Cf (Yf∪Z
S
f ∪{z}). Assume that C
f(Yf∪Z
S
f ∪{z})∩Z
S
f = ∅.
Therefore, we have Cf(Yf ∪ Z
S
f ∪ {z}) ⊆ (Yf ∪ {z}) ⊆ (Yf ∪ Z
S
f ∪ {z}), so from IRC
z ∈ Cf (Yf ∪ {z}), so {z} is (Y, f)-acceptable.
2. If {z} is not (Y, f)-acceptable then there are some contracts {z1, z2 . . . zk} = C
f(Yf ∪
ZSf ∪ {z}) ∩ Z
S
f . If there exists an zi such that is {zi} is not (Y, f)-acceptable, then
using SSS again, we have zi ∈ C
f(Yf ∪ {z, zi}). Suppose z /∈ C
f(Yf ∪ {z, zi}), then
Cf(Yf ∪{z, zi}) ⊆ (Yf ∪{zi}), and from IRC we have C
f(Yf ∪{z, zi}) = C
f(Yf ∪{zi}).
But since {zi} is not (Y, f)-acceptable this is impossible, therefore {z, zi} ⊆ C
f(Yf ∪
{z, zi}), we achieved a (Y, f)-essential pair.
3. If all of {z1, z2 . . . zk} are (Y, f)-acceptable.
A consequence of Lemma B.8 is that trail stability is stronger than weak trail stability
under full substitutability.
Proof of Proposition 9. Consider a trail-stable outcome A. Suppose that A is not weakly
trail-stable, i.e. there exists a sequentially blocking trail T = {x1, x2 . . . xM} for it. Without
loss of generality, we may assume that (b)ii holds in Definition 8. The other case when (b)i
holds can be proved analogously.
We are going to find indices 1 ≤ i1 < i2 < i3 . . . il ≤ k such that
• {xi1} is (A, s(i1))-acceptable, and
• b(xim−1) = s(xim) = fm and {xim−1 , xim} is a (A, fm)-essential pair for all 1 < m ≤ l,
and
• {xil} is (A, b(il))-acceptable.
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So this subset of the trail forms a locally blocking trail T ′.
In the sequentially blocking trail T , choose the last contract xi ∈ T such that {xi}
is (A, s(xi))-acceptable. There is at least one contract like this, since {x1} is (A, s(x1))-
acceptable by definition. Let i1 = i.
Suppose we have already found i1 . . . im that satisfies our requirements. If {xim} is
(A, b(xim))-acceptable, we end the trail there, and let l = m. Otherwise, from the defi-
nition of sequentially blocking trails, for fm+1 = b(xim), the ending subsequence T
≥m
f =
{xm, ..., xM} ∩ Tf is (A, fm+1)-acceptable. Using Lemma B.8, there is a contract xim+1 ∈
T≥mf ∩X
S
f such that im+1 > im and {xim−1 , xim} is a (A, fm)-essential pair.
This way, we constructed a locally blocking trail, therefore A is not trail-stable.
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C When do solution concepts coincide?
As we have seen, stable, trail-stable, and weakly trail-stable outcomes typically do not
coincide in general trading networks. In this section, we introduce two sufficient conditions
on agents’ preferences that ensure that these solution concepts coincide.
C.1 Trail stability and weak trail stability
Our first restriction generalizes “flow-based” choice functions (Fleiner, 2014, Fleiner et al.,
2018).
Definition C.1. Choice functions of f ∈ F are separable if for any A,W ⊆ X and y ∈ XBf \A
and z ∈ XSf \A, whenever A is (W, f)-acceptable, and {y, z} is a (W, f)-essential pair, then
A ∪ {y, z} is (W, f)-acceptable.
Separable choice functions impose a kind of independence on choices of pairs of upstream
and downstream contracts. It says that whenever the firm chooses A alongside some set W
and {y, z} alongside W (but y and z would not be chosen separately alongside W since {y, z}
is a (W, f)-essential pair), then it would choose A ∪ {y, z} alongside W . Suppose signing
A and {y, z} are decisions made by separate units of the firm. Separable choice functions
say that it can delegate the joint input-output decisions to the units because its overall
choices do not require any coordination between the units. One natural example of separable
choice functions is the following: suppose each firms totally orders individual upstream
contracts and individual downstream contracts. Whenever a firm is offered k downstream
and l upstream contracts, it chooses the z best upstream and the z best downstream contracts
where z = min(k, l).
We now pin down the role of separability for weakly trail-stable and trail-stable outcomes.
Proposition 10. Suppose that choice functions satisfy full substitutability, separability, and
IRC. Then an outcome is trail-stable if and only if it is weakly trail-stable.
Proof of Proposition 10. Proposition 9 implies that if outcome A is trail-stable then A is also
weakly trail-stable. So assume that outcome A is weakly trail-stable. If A is not trail-stable
then there is a locally blocking trail T to A. The separability property of the choice functions
imply that T is a sequentially blocking trail, contradicting the weak trail stability of A. So
A is trail-stable.
Separability is crucial for the correspondence between trail-stable and weakly trail-stable
outcomes. Separability ensures that all sequentially blocking trails are locally blocking trails.
Under separability all properties of trail-stable outcomes apply to weakly trail-stable out-
comes.28 Note that in Example 4, j’s preferences were not separable and weak trail-stable
outcome did not coincide with trail-stable outcomes.
28 We also conjecture that in any trading networkX if choice functions of F satisfy full substitutability and
only LAD/LAS then the terminal-weakly-trail-stable contract sets form a lattice under terminal superiority,
but leave this for future work.
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C.2 Trail stability and stability
Separability is not enough to ensure that trail stable outcomes coincide with stable out-
comes, since stable outcomes might not exist under full substitutability and separability (see
Example 1). We turn to another preference restriction.
Definition C.2. Choice functions of f ∈ F are simple if there exists an “intensity” mapping
w : Xf → R such that whenever A is a (W, f)-acceptable set for some acceptable set W of
contracts, then for every y ∈ XBf ∩A there exists z ∈ X
S
f ∩ A such that w(y) > w(z) holds.
One example of choice functions which are simple are the following: if the agent is
offered a set of contracts, he picks the upstream contract y with the highest intensity and a
downstream contract z with the lowest intensity (as long as the intensity of the y is greater
than of z, otherwise he picks nothing). For example, if the intensity mapping w represents
the per-unit price of the contract, then the condition says that the firm only signs a pair of
contracts if the price in the downstream contract is greater than the price in the upstream
contract, while picking the highest-price downstream contract and the lowest-price upstream
contract.
Proposition 11. Suppose that choice functions satisfy full substitutability, simplicity, and
IRC. Then an outcome is stable if and only if it is weakly trail-stable.
Under simplicity all properties of trail-stable outcomes (including existence!) apply to
stable outcomes.
Proof of Proposition 11. Proposition 9 implies that if outcome A is stable then A is also
trail-stable. Assume that outcome A is trail-stable, but not stable, so it has a blocking set
Z.
Case 1: Suppose that for any z ∈ Z contract {z} is neither (A, s(z))-acceptable nor
(A, b(z))-acceptable. Then using Lemma B.8 we can find a circuit Q = {z1, z2, . . . zk} ⊆ Z
such that {zi, zi+1} is an (A, b(zi))-essential pair for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k and {zk, z1} is an
(A, b(zk))-essential pair. Since every {zi, zi+1} an (A, b(zi))-acceptable set by itself, as choice
functions are simple, intensity function w must strictly decrease along circuit Q, which is
impossible.
Case 2: Suppose that for every z ∈ Z, {z} ⊆ Z is A-acceptable. Suppose that {z1} is
(A, s(z1))-acceptable. From Lemma B.8 we can find a trail {z2, z3 . . . zk} ⊆ Z such that for
every zi, either {zi, zi+1} is a (A, b(zi))-essential pair, (therefore w(zi) > w(zi+1)) or there are
some y1 . . . yl such that b(yj) = s(zi) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ l and {zi, y1 . . . yl} is (A, b(zi))-acceptable.
From the simplicity property there is a yj such that w(zi) > w(yj), this yj contract will be
zi+1. The trail terminates at the first occasion when {zi} is (A, b(zi))-acceptable.
Since the intensity strictly decreases, we cannot get back to a contract used earlier in the
trail, so the trail must terminate. Let us pick a contract {zi} in the trail such that it is the
last one which is (A, s(zi))-acceptable, and then choose the smallest j such that j ≥ i and
{zj} is (A, b(zj))-acceptable. From Lemma B.8, the trail from zi to zj is locally blocking, so
outcome A is not trail-stable.
32
D Path stability
We can also weaken trail stability by insisting that trails only include any agent at most
once so firms only have one opportunity to recontract during a deviation. A trail T is a path
if all the agents F (T ) involved in the trail are distinct.
Definition D.1. An outcome A ⊆ X is path-stable if
1. A is acceptable.
2. There is no path P = {x1, x2, . . . , xM}, such that P ∩A = ∅ and
(a) {x1} is (A, f1)-acceptable for f1 = s(x1), and
(b) {xm−1, xm} is (A, fm)-acceptable for fm = b(xm−1) = s(xm) whenever 1 < m ≤M
and
(c) {xM} is (A, fM+1)-acceptable for fM+1 = b(xM ).
Path-stable outcomes rule out consecutive pairwise deviations along paths. Since every
path is a trail, every trail-stable outcome is path-stable. In acyclic networks every trail is
also path, so path-stable, weakly trail-stable and trail-stable outcomes coincide with stable
outcomes (Hatfield and Kominers, 2012). However, as the example below shows, path sta-
bility is weaker than weak trail stability (and hence weaker than trail stability) in general
trading networks under full substitutability. This is intuitive because paths allows the firms
to appear in the blocking set only once therefore they rule out fewer possible blocks.
Example 5 (Path-stable outcomes are not necessarily trail-stable). Consider agents and
contracts described in Examples 1 and 2, and Figure 1. Agents have the following fully
substitutable preferences:
≻m : {w} ≻m ∅
≻i : {x} ≻i ∅
≻k : {z, y} ≻k ∅
≻j : {w, x, z, y} ≻j {w, z} ≻j {y, x} ≻j {y, z} ≻j ∅
The empty set is preferred to any other set of contracts.
Now, for outcome ∅, the trail {w, z, y, x} is locally blocking, but there is no blocking path
for A = ∅. Outcome {z, y} is, however, blocked by path {w, x}. Therefore the trail-stable
outcome is {w, z, y, x} and the path-stable outcomes are ∅ and {w, z, y, x}.
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